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Abstract. Formal modelling and verification are widely used in the de-
velopment of safety-critical systems. They aim at providing a mathemati-
cally-grounded argument about system safety. In particular, this argu-
ment can facilitate construction of a safety case – a structured safety
assurance document required for certification of safety-critical systems.
However, currently there is no adequate support for using the artefacts
created during formal modelling in safety case development. In this pa-
per, we present an approach and the corresponding tool support that
tackles this problem in the Event-B modelling framework. Our approach
establishes a link between safety requirements, Event-B models and cor-
responding fragments of a safety case. The supporting automated tool
ensures traceability between requirements, models and safety cases.
1 Introduction
Formal techniques provide the designers with a rigorous mathematical basis for
reasoning about the system behaviour and properties. Usually formal modelling
helps in uncovering problems in requirements definition as well as deriving ad-
ditional constraints for ensuring safety. Though formal modelling provide the
designers with a valuable input for safety assurance, currently there is no ade-
quate support for integrating the results of formal modelling into construction
of safety argument – a safety case. In this paper, we propose a method and tool
support for linking formal modelling in Event-B and safety case construction.
Event-B is a formal framework for correct-by-construction system develop-
ment [1]. It has been extensively experimented with in the industrial setting [2,3].
The framework employs refinement as the main development technique and
proofs to verify correctness of the system behaviour with respect to system-
level properties, such as safety. The industrial-strength tool support – the Rodin
platform [4] – provides the developers with highly automated environment for
modelling and verification.
To efficiently exploit the benefits of formal modelling, in this paper we present
an automated integrated approach that facilitates construction of safety cases
from Event-B models. The approach spans over requirements engineering, for-
mal modelling and safety argumentation via safety cases. While automating
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Fig. 1. Event-B machine and context
the proposed approach, we aim at creating a non-obtrusive tool support that
nevertheless allows us to maintain the link between the dynamically chang-
ing requirements, models and safety cases. To achieve this goal, we relied on
a novel industry-driven standard OSLC – Open Services for Life Cycle Col-
laborations [5]. The standard allows the engineers to achieve inter-operability
between engineering tools by specifying the access to the external resources of
these tools. We believe that the proposed approach has two main benefits: it
supports co-engineering of requirements, models and safety cases, while the tool
support ensures seamless interoperability and traceability across the domains.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe our chosen for-
mal framework – Event-B as well as discuss classification and formalisation of
safety requirements in Event-B. Section 3 presents our methodology for con-
structing safety cases from requirements and artefacts of formal modelling. In
Section 4, we present the steam boiler case study demonstrating the proposed
methodology. Section 5 presents our proposal on dynamic tool integration in a
common information environment. Finally, in Section 6, we overview the related
work and give some concluding remarks.
2 Modelling and Verification of Safety-Critical Systems
in Event-B
Event-B: Background. Event-B is a state-based framework that promotes the
top-down, correct-by-construction approach to system development and formal
verification by theorem proving. In Event-B, a system model is specified as an
abstract state machine [1]. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model
state, represented as a collection of variables, and defines operations on the state,
i.e., it describes the dynamic behaviour of a modelled system. The variables are
strongly typed by the constraining predicates that together with other important
properties of the systems are defined in the model invariants. Usually, a machine
has an accompanying component, called context, which includes user-defined
sets, constants and their properties given as a list of model axioms.
A general form for Event-B models is given in Fig. 1. The machine is uniquely
identified by its name M . The state variables, v, are declared in the Variables
clause and initialised in the Init event. The variables are strongly typed by the
constraining predicates I given in the Invariants clause. The invariant clause
might also contain other predicates defining properties (e.g., safety invariants)
that should be preserved during system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by a set of atomic events.
Generally, an event has the following form:
e =̂ any a where Ge then Re end,
where e is the event’s name, a is the list of local variables, the guard Ge is a pred-
icate over the local variables of the event and the state variables of the system.
The event body is defined by a multiple (possibly nondeterministic) assignment
over the system variables. In Event-B, such an assignment represents the corre-
sponding next-state relation Re. The guard defines the conditions under which
the event is enabled, i.e., its body can be executed. If several events are enabled
at the same time, any of them can be chosen for execution nondeterministically.
Event-B development starts from an abstract specification that nondetermin-
istically models most essential functional requirements. In a sequence of refine-
ment steps, we gradually reduce nondeterminism and introduce detailed design
decisions. In particular, we can add new events, split events as well as replace
abstract variables by their concrete counterparts, i.e., perform data refinement.
The consistency of Event-B models, i.e., verification of well-formedness and
invariant preservation as well as correctness of refinement steps, is demonstrated
by discharging a number of verification conditions – proof obligations. Moreover,
the Event-B formalism allows the developers themselves to formulate theorems
to be proven. Full definitions of all the proof obligations are given in [1].
The Rodin platform [6] provides an automated support for formal modelling
and verification in Event-B. In particular, it automatically generates the required
proof obligations and attempts to discharge them. The remaining unproven con-
ditions can be dealt with by using the provided interactive provers.
Formalisation of Safety Requirements in Event-B. Formal modelling is
especially beneficial for requirements engineering. It helps to spot missing or con-
tradictory requirements and rigorously define system properties and constraints.
In a succession of EU projects [2,4,7], the most prominent of which is Deploy [2],
we have gained significant experience in modelling safety-critical systems from
different domains. It allowed us to identify a number of typical solutions for rep-
resenting requirements in formal models. These solutions can be represented as
classes of requirements (for more details, see [8]). Below we give a few examples
of the classes of the requirements:
– Class 1 : Global properties – contain invariant properties to be maintained;
– Class 2 : Local properties – define effects of certain action in a particular
system state;
– Class 3 : Causal order – define the required order of system events;
– Class 4 : Absence of system deadlock – require that execution of safety actions
should not be prevented by a deadlock.
Table 1 summarises typical representation of the above classes in an Event-B
model. Formally, the described relationships can be defined as a function FM
mapping safety requirements (SRs) into a set of the related model expressions:
SRs → P(MExpr),
Table 1. Formalisation of safety requirements
Safety Model element Associated verification
requirement expressions theorem(s)
SR of Cl. 1 invariants group of invariance theorems for each event
SR of Cl. 2 event, theorem about a specific post-state of
state predicate an event
SR of Cl. 3 pairs of events, group of theorems about enabling
event control flow relationships between events
SR of Cl. 4 all events theorem about the deadlock freedom
where P(T ) corresponds to a power set on elements of T and MExpr stands
for a generalised type for all possible expressions that can be built from the
model elements, i.e., model expressions. Here model elements are basic elements
of Event-B models such as axioms, variables, invariants, events, and attributes.
Such defined mapping allows us to trace the system safety requirements given
in an informal manner into formal specifications in Event-B.
Formal modelling and verification allow the designers to not only achieve a
high confidence in system design, but also justify system safety during certifi-
cation. The increasing reliance on safety cases in the certification process has
motivated our work on linking formal modelling in Event-B with safety case
construction – the work that we describe next.
3 From Event-B Models to Safety Cases
Safety cases: Background. A safety case is “a structured argument, sup-
ported by a body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid case that a
system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment” [9]. The
construction, review and acceptance of safety cases are valuable steps in the
safety assurance process of critical systems. Several industrial standards, e.g.,
ISO 26262 [10] and EN 50126 [11], prescribe production and evaluation of safety
cases for system certification.
In general, safety cases can be documented either textually or graphically.
Currently, the graphical notation called Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [12,13]
is gaining popularity for presenting safety arguments within safety cases. GSN
aims at graphical representation of safety case elements as well as the relation-
ships between them. The building blocks of GSN are shown in Fig. 2. Essentially,
such a constructed safety case consists of goals, strategies and solutions. Here
goals are the requirements, targets or constraints to be met by a system. Solu-
tions contain the information extracted from analysis, verification or simulation
of a system (i.e., evidence) to show that the goals have been met. Finally, strate-
gies are reasoning steps describing how goals are decomposed into sub-goals.
Safety case elements can be in two types of relationships: “Is solved by” and
“In context of”. The former is used between goals, strategies and solutions. The
latter links a goal (a strategy) to a context, an assumption or a justification.
GSN has been extended with generic argument patterns [12], supporting
structural and entity abstraction. The examples of structural abstraction are
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multiplicity and optionality. Multiplicity is a generalised n-ary relationship be-
tween the GSN elements, while optionality stands for optional and alternative
relationship between them. There are also two extensions for entity abstraction:
uninstantiated entity as well as undeveloped and uninstantiated entity. The for-
mer one specifies that the entity requires to be instantiated, i.e., to be replaced
with a more concrete instance. In Fig. 2, this is depicted as a hollow triangle.
The latter one indicates that the entity needs both further development and
instantiation. This is displayed as a hollow diamond with a line in the middle.
From Requirements to Safety Cases via Event-B models. The approach
proposed at this paper should create an information continuum that spans re-
quirements engineering, formal modelling and safety case construction as shown
in Fig. 3. Problems with defining a safety argument during safety case construc-
tion might indicate that some safety requirements are overlooked or a formal
specification is not sufficiently constrained. Such a feedback should invoke the
corresponding corrective actions (a dashed line in Fig. 3).
The proposed approach encompasses two main activities : (1) representation
of safety requirements in Event-B models, and (2) derivation of safety cases from
the associated Event-B specifications. The activities are tightly connected with
each other. They depend on several factors such as adequacy of representation
of the system behaviour by a formal model and availability of modelling and
verification artefact to substantiate safety argument.
To facilitate the first activity – representation of safety requirements in Event-
B models – we rely on our classification and mapping rules defined above. To
simplify the task of linking the formalised system safety requirements with the
constructed safety case, we propose a set of classification-based argument pat-
terns. In addition, a special pattern is created to provide the argumentation that
the formal model we rely on is by itself correct and well-defined.
The patterns have been developed using the described above GSN extensions.
Some parts of an argument pattern may remain the same for any instance, while
others need to be further instantiated (those are labelled with a hollow triangle).
The text highlighted by braces { } should be replaced by a concrete value.
A generic representation of a classification-based argument pattern is given
in Fig. 4. Here, a safety requirement Requirement of some class Class {X} is
Safety requirements 
representation in Event-B
Derivation of safety cases
from Event-B specifications
Formal specification
in Event-B 
· constants
· axioms
· variables
· invariants
· theorems
· events
Proof 
obligations
Hazard analysis: 
HAZOP, PHA, 
FMEA, etc.
Solution
Sn1
Goal
G1
Strategy
S1
Sub-goal
G2
Sub-goal
G3
C1
Context
Safety case
System
safety 
requirements
Fig. 3. High-level representation of the overall approach
reflected in the goal GX. According to the proposed approach, the requirement
is verified within a formal model M in Event-B (the model element MX.1).
In order to obtain the evidence that a specific safety requirement is met,
different construction techniques might be undertaken. The choice of a particular
technique influences the argumentation strategies to be used in each pattern.
For example, if a safety requirement can be associated with a model invariant
property, the corresponding theorem for each event in the model M is required
to be proved. Correspondingly, the proofs of these theorems are attached as the
evidence for the constructed safety case.
To bridge a semantic gap in the mapping associating an informally specified
safety requirement with the corresponding formal expression in Event-B, we need
to argue over a correct formalisation of the requirement (SX.2 in Fig. 4). We rely
on a joint inspection conducted by domain and formalisation experts (SnX.2)
as the evidence that the associated model elements (via the defined mappings)
are proper formalisations of the requirement under consideration.
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Fig. 4. Generic argument pattern
As soon as all safety requirements are assigned to their respective classes
and their mapping into Event-B elements is performed, we can construct the
part of a safety case corresponding to assurance of these requirements. To make
this construction generic, we associate each class with the corresponding safety
case argument pattern that can be instantiated in different ways. Note that
the process of safety requirements elicitation is left outside of consideration in
this paper. We assume that the given list of these requirements is completed
beforehand by applying safety analysis techniques.
In the next section, we will illustrate such safety case construction by a case
study. More details of the proposed arguments patterns can be found in [14].
4 Case Study: a Steam Boiler System
In this section, we demonstrate our approach by a case study – a steam boiler
control system [15]. Due to lack of space, we only give a brief overview of system
requirements, constructed formal models and fragments of the safety case. The
complete description can be found in [16].
Steam Boiler: Requirements and Development Strategy. The steam
boiler is a safety-critical control system that produces steam and adjusts the
quantity of water in the steam boiler chamber to maintain it between the lower
safety boundary M1 and upper safety boundary M2 . The situations when the
water level is too low or high are hazardous and must be avoided.
The system consists of the following units: a chamber, a pump, a valve, a
sensor to measure the water quantity in the chamber, a sensor to measure the
steam quantity out of the chamber, a sensor to measure water input through the
pump, and a sensor to measure water output through the valve.
After being powered on, the system enters the Initialisation mode. At each
control cycle, the system reads sensors and performs failure detection. If no
failure detected, the system may enter one of its operational modes Normal,
Degraded or Rescue. In the Normal mode, the system attempts to maintain
the water level in the chamber between the normal boundaries N1 and N2 (such
that N1 < N2) providing that no failures of the system units have occurred.
In the Degraded mode, the system tries to maintain the water level within
the normal boundaries despite failures of some physical non-critical units. In the
Rescue mode, the system attempts to maintain the normal water level in the
presence of a failure of the critical unit – the water level sensor. If failures of the
system units and the water level sensor occur simultaneously or the water level
is outside of the predefined safety boundaries M1 and M2 (such that M1 < M2),
the system enters the non-operational mode Emergency Stop.
The failure of the steam boiler control system is detected if either the water
level in the chamber is outside of the safety boundaries or the combination of a
water level sensor failure and a failure of any other system unit (the pump or
the steam sensor) is detected. The water level sensor is considered as failed if it
returns a value which is outside of the nominal sensor range or the estimated
range predicted in the last cycle. In a similar way, a steam output sensor failure
is detected. The pump fails if it does not change its state when required.
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Our Event-B development of the steam boiler case study consists of an ab-
stract specification and its four refinements [16]. The abstract model (MACHINE
M0) implements a basic control loop. The first refinement (MACHINE M1) in-
troduces an abstract representation of the activities performed after the system
is powered on and during system operation. The second refinement (MACHINE
M2) introduces a detailed representation of the system failure conditions. The
third refinement (MACHINE M3) models the system physical environment as
well as elaborates on more advanced failure detection procedures. Finally, the
fourth refinement (MACHINE M4) introduces a representation of the required
execution modes. Each machine has the associated context where the necessary
data structures are introduced and their properties are postulated as axioms.
From an Event-B model to a Safety Case. The steam boiler control system
should adhere to a number of safety requirements. Let us illustrate construction
of fragments of a safety case for some given safety requirements.
The main safety requirement – SR-02: During the system operation the water
level shall not exceed the predefined safety boundaries belongs to requirements
Class 1. A natural way to formalise these requirements is by associating them
with the corresponding invariant properties in the associated Event-B model.
Therefore, the proposed form of the mapping function for Class 1 is
Reqi 7→ {safety invi1, ..., safety inviN}
for each such requirement Reqi and its associated invariants.
To formally verify the requirement, we have to prove the invariant preser-
vation for all the affected model events.4 The discharged proof obligations can
be used then as the safety case evidence that the requirement holds. This is
reflected in the associated safety case argument pattern for Class 1 (see Fig.5).
4 The affected model events are those that change any variables appearing in the
considered invariant(s).
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We formalise the requirement SR-02 as the invariant inv1.2 at the first
refinement step of the Event-B development (MACHINE M1):
inv1.2: failure = FALSE ∧ phase ∈ {CONT, PRED} ⇒
min water level ≥M1 ∧ max water level ≤M2,
where the variable failure represents a system failure, the variable phase models
the stages of the steam boiler controller behaviour (i.e., the stages of its control
loop), and finally the variables min water level and max water level represent
the estimated interval for the sensed water level.
The (fragment of) mapping function FM for this case is
SR-02 7→ {inv1.2},
which is a concrete instance of its general form given above.
Finally, we instantiate the argument pattern for Class 1 as shown in Fig. 6.
To support the claim that inv1.2 holds for all the affected events, we attach the
discharged proof obligations as the evidence.
Since the steam boiler system is a failsafe system, whenever an unrecoverable
system failure occurs, the system should be stopped. In our model, such a failure
is associated with raising the corresponding flag stop. The overall condition is
defined by the safety requirement SR-01: When a system failure is detected, the
steam boiler control system shall be shut down and an alarm shall be activated.
The requirements belonging to Class 2 that represents local properties, i.e.,
the properties that need to be true at particular points of system execution. In
terms of Event-B, the particular system states we are interested in are usually
associated with some desired post-states of specific model events. Hence, the
proposed form of the mapping function for Class 2 is
Reqi 7→ {(eventi1, q1), ..., (eventiN , qN )},
where Reqi is a requirement, eventij are the associated events, and qj are the de-
sired post-conditions for those events. For each pair of an event and a predicate,
it is rather straightforward in Event-B to generate the corresponding theorem,
which becomes an additional proof obligation. In its turn, the proved theorem
becomes the evidence for the constructed safety case (see [14] for details).
The corresponding instance of the mapping function FM for SR-01 is
SR-01 7→ {(EmergencyStop, stop = TRUE)}.
Thus, we formalise the requirement by associating it with the desired post-
condition stop = TRUE of the event EmergencyStop. To verify it, we construct
and prove the following theorem:
thm1.1: ∀stop′ · stop′ ∈ BOOL ∧ (∃phase, stop · phase ∈ PHASE ∧
stop ∈ BOOL ∧ phase = CONT ∧ stop = FALSE ∧ stop′ = TRUE)
⇒ stop′ = TRUE,
The theorem is trivially true (i.e., automatically discharged by the Rodin provers).
The instantiated fragment of the safety case is presented in Fig. 7. The proof
obligation thm1.1/THM serves as the evidence that this requirement holds.
The steam boiler is a typical control system that cyclically executes a prede-
fined sequence of actions: reading sensors, detecting failures, executing control
actions or error recovery, and predicting the next system state. We can formulate
that sequence of events as a corresponding requirement belonging to Class 3.
Formally, the ordering between system events can be expressed as a particular
relationship amongst possible pre- and post-states of the corresponding model
events. We rely on flow Event-B extension proposed by Iliasov [17] to verify that
the required order of events is enforced. The Flow plug-in for the Rodin platform
allows us to express all these relationships in a diagrammatic way, generating
the corresponding theorems automatically.
In this paper, we omit further illustration of safety case construction for
different classes of requirements. However, let us note that to ensure that the
constructed safety arguments are valid, we also have to define a special argument
pattern that demonstrates well-definedness of the formal models themselves as
described in the accompanying technical report [14].
The use of the Rodin platform and accompanying plug-ins has facilitated
derivation of formal evidence that the given safety requirements hold for the
modelled system. The proof-based semantics of Event-B (a strong relationship
between model elements and the associated proof obligations) has given us a
direct access to the corresponding proof obligations, which in turn allowed us to
explicitly refer to their proofs in the resulting safety case.
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In this section, we demonstrated how models and proofs in Event-B can be
used in construction of a safety case. Though the resultant development appears
as a linearly constructed refinement chain, in practice it is a result of several
iterations of trials and errors. To maintain traceability between the requirements,
models and safety case fragments, we need to create an automated integrated
engineering environment – the problem that we discuss next.
5 Integrated Automated Tool Support
Development of safety-critical systems is a joint effort of engineers from diverse
domains, including electro-mechanical, hardware, software, safety etc. Each of
the engineering teams applies domain-specific analysis and design methods and
correspondingly uses the dedicated engineering tools. Though the engineering
environment is inherently heterogenous, productivity of the development pro-
cess and safety per se depend on how seamlessly the information about design
decisions and constraints propagates across domains.
Let us consider the interactions between requirements engineering and formal
modelling. Formal modelling typically results in identifying problems in given
requirements (e.g., missing or contradictory ones) as well as deriving the con-
straints for the requirements to be satisfied. Hence, requirements definition and
model creation co-evolve, and changes in one domain should invoke changes in
the other. In its turn, these changes should be reflected in a safety case. Since
the safety case construction should proceed alongside the development, the in-
ability to produce safety argument may trigger the whole chain of requirement
re-definition, formal model change and safety case re-construction.
Therefore, to address establishing an information continuum from require-
ments to safety cases, we should create a platform for non-obtrusive integration
of tools in an integrated tool chain. The work presented in the paper is a part
of a more general ongoing effort of tool integration as well as formalisation and
mechanisation of rules that turn a collection of disparate tools into a tool chain.
We believe that dynamic tool integration enabling real-time sharing of data is
the way to build tool chains of tomorrow. There is enough technological context
to make such integration relatively cheap and painless, even for pre-existing
tools not meant to operate in a dynamic setting. The enabling technologies we
consider crucial are the structured data representation with stable identifiers and
the actor paradigm. The former gives a common syntactic base for all the tools
without enforcing unreasonable restrictions. An example of such a technology
is OSLC [5] described below. The actor model provides a simple and flexible
integration framework detached from the logic and code of integrated tools.
Before describing our solution in more detail, let us give a brief overview of
a new industry-driven interoperability standard – OSLC – that we rely on.
OSLC: Background. Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration (OSLC) [5] is
an open community, the goal of which is to create specifications for integrat-
ing tools, their data and workflows to support lifecycle processes. OSLC address
integration scenarios for individual topics such as change management, test man-
agement, requirements management and configuration management.
In simple terms, OSLC specifications focus on how the external resources of
a particular tool can be accessed, browsed over, and specific change requests can
be made. OSLC is not trying to standardise the behaviour of any tool. Instead,
OSLC specifies a minimum amount of protocol and a small number of resource
types to allow two different tools to work together relatively seamlessly.
To ensure coherence and integration across these domains, each workgroup
builds on the concepts and rules defined in the OSLC Core specification [18].
OSLC Core consists mostly of standard rules and patterns for using HTTP and
RDF (Resource Description Framework) that all the domains must adopt.
In OSLC, each artefact in the lifecycle – a requirement, test case, source file
etc. – is an HTTP resource that is manipulated using the standard HTTP meth-
ods (GET, POST, etc.). Each resource has its RDF representation, which allows
statements about resources in the form of subject/predicate/object expressions,
i.e., as linked data. Other formats, like JSON or HTML, are also supported.
OSLC Requirements Management (RM) specification is built on the top of
OSLC Core. It supports key REST APIs for software Requirements Management
systems. The additionally specified properties describe the requirements-related
resources and the relationships between them.
There are several different approaches to implementing an OSLC provider for
software. For this work, we rely on so called the Adapter approach. It proposes
to create a new web application that acts as an OSLC adapter, runs along-side of
the target application, provides OSLC support and ”under the hood” makes calls
to the application web APIs to create, retrieve, and update external resources.
OSLC Tool Bus. To enable tool interconnection, we require that each tool has
an OSLC adapter. The adapter offers a web service style API for traversing as
well as changing tool data in real time. Generally, all well designed tools following
the model-view-controller design pattern (e.g., based on Eclipse GMF) can be
easily extended with an OSLC adapter.
An OSLC adapter is purely passive: it offers access to structured data that
may be rendered in differing formats. It does not by itself link two tools together.
The linking, or as we call it, tool orchestration, requires an additional piece of
logic to define how and when the tools need to exchange information as illus-
trated in Fig. 8. An orchestration solution must (i) ensure that common names
refer to same concepts, and (ii) manage the information flow between the tools.
To address this, we propose to use the agent paradigm [19], where each tool
comes with one or more agents necessary for tool coordination. A collection
of agents working together coordinating several tools is called an orchestration
component. A tool may be a part of several interactions (see Fig. 8). Thus, e.g., a
specification may be interlinked with code base, a safety case and requirements.
The role of an agent is to represent the interests of a respective tool by noti-
fying other agents of any relevant new data and also acting on any such updates
from other agents. The underlying communication framework implements a fed-
erated tuple space [20] - a distributed implementation of a shared blackboard
with Linda coordination primitives [21]. To simplify agent implementation, we
also offer the publisher/subscriber and mailbox communication styles realised
OSLC Adapter
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... Runtime Monitoring
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Code Base
Orchestration Component
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Fig. 8. OSLC-based tool bus.
on top of the tuple space API. Asynchronous message passing is a good fit for
real-time coordination of a distributed tool chain, while federated tuple space
is especially well-suited to loosely coupled parties that at times may be dis-
connected from some or all of peers. It is possible to construct generic agents
able to handle simple tasks like synchronising certain data of some two tools or
constantly broadcasting changes to a certain part of tool data. This enables, in
principle, a compositional approach to agent design where complex orchestration
logic is built, brick by brick, from the predefined agents.
A logical extension of this idea is fusion of an agent specification and the tool
OSLC interface. Recall that OSLC is primarily a gateway to the tool data. It
does not span across several tools. We are working on a way to extend an OSLC
specification with the coordination meta-data defining the logic of orchestration
components via static documents serialised in, e.g., XML or RDF form.
Prototype Tool Chain. In our prototype implementation, we aim at building
an environment that integrates requirements engineering, formal modelling and
verification, and safety case development. We strive to retain flexibility and
notation that is native for each domain. For instance, requirements are defined
in natural language. To maintain the link between the dynamically changing
requirements and the associated formal models, we have created a prototype
Requirements-Rodin adapter [22]. Formal modelling is done using the Event-B
language, while safety cases are generated in a goal-structuring notation.
Our requirements tool uses the generic principle of organising requirements
into a tree with further optional cross-links between them, and their classifi-
cations (by taxonomy, component, developer, etc.). The tool provides a sim-
ple form-based user interface. It embeds a web-service that provides OSLC-
compliant RDF descriptions of requirements. Every requirement may be referred
to by the project name and requirement id.
The second part of the prototype achieves a similar goal for the Rodin
Platform. We have developed a Rodin plug-in that exposes the Event-B model
database and proofs as externally referable OSLC resources. Once again, each
model element (variable, invariant, refinement) has a unique global identifiers
that can be used to cross-link with other OSLC and RDF resources.
The third part of the environment facilitates generation of safety case. It
maps relevant elements of requirements and models into the corresponding parts
of safety case, i.e., allows to reuse the results of formal modelling and verification
to construct a safety argument.
6 Related Work and Conclusions
Related work. The relationships between formal methods and safety cases have
been studied along two main directions: to prove soundness of safety argument
and gather evidences from formal modelling to substantiate safety argument. The
most prominent work on the former is by Rushby [23], in which he formalises
the top-level safety argument to support automated soundness checking. The
obtained theorem can be then verified by a theorem prover or a model checker.
Our work is closer to the second research direction. Hawkins et al. [24] propose
an approach that relies on static analysis of program code to demonstrate that
the software does not contain hazardous errors. In [25], the authors automate
generation of heterogeneous safety cases, starting from a (manually developed)
top-level system safety case, while lower-level fragments are automatically gen-
erated from formal verification of safety requirements. In [26], to ensure that
a model derived during model-driven development of a safety critical system
satisfies all the required properties, the authors use the obtained model check-
ing results. Our approach follows a similar idea. The main difference is in the
reliance on the introduced requirements classification to construct both associ-
ated formal model and resulting safety argument. Moreover, the automatic tool
support created for the proposed approach significantly improves its usability.
Conclusions. In this paper, we have presented an approach and a prototype
tool implementation for integrating formal modelling in Event-B into the process
of development and assurance of safety-critical systems. We aimed at providing
support for linking requirements and formal models as well as efficient reuse of
formal modelling and verification artefacts in safety case construction. The pro-
totype tool implementation provides a platform for dynamic information sharing
between safety engineers and verification team. It relies on the idea of linked data
promoted by the OSLC standard, which is now rapidly spreading in industry.
To validate the approach, we have undertaken formal development and safety
case construction of the steam boiler system. In our work, to test the approach
scalability and usability, we have deliberately aimed at representing a large set
of complex requirements of the system and then constructing the safety case.
We believe that the proposed approach is beneficial for the development of
complex safety-critical systems because it allows the engineers to establish an
information continuum between different involved domains. As a future work, we
are planning to continue our work on integration by focusing on the integration
with techniques for safety analysis as well as different verification tools.
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